In the first part of this paper we have derived achievable transmission rates for the (single-band) interference relay channel (IRC) when the relay implements either the amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward or estimate-andforward protocol. Here, we consider wireless networks that can be modeled by a multi-band IRC. We tackle the existence issue of Nash equilibria (NE) in these networks where each information source is assumed to selfishly allocate its power between the available bands in order to maximize its individual transmission rate. Interestingly, it is possible to show that the three power allocation (PA) games (corresponding to the three protocols assumed) under investigation are concave, which guarantees the existence of a pure NE after Rosen [3] . Then, as the relay can also optimize several parameters e.g., its position and transmit power, it is further considered as the leader of a Stackelberg game where the information sources are the followers. Our theoretical analysis is illustrated by simulations giving more insights on the addressed issues.
at the relay nodes are independent of the power of the signals they receive. Sec. IV also comprises two special cases, one case where the game is due to the power allocation between the bands and another one where it is due to the power allocation between the fine and coarse messages in the DF protocol (following the comments made in Part I). Then, in Sec. VI, we formulate the PA problem as a Stackelberg game by introducing the relay as an additional player of a hierarchical game in order to know how the relay parameters should be tuned in practice. Sec. VII provides, in particular, simulations showing the importance of choosing the amplification factor properly for the ZDSAF protocol and optimally locating the relay.
Summarizing remarks and possible extensions are given in Sec. VIII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
The system under investigation comprises two source nodes S 1 , S 2 , transmitting their private messages to their respective destination nodes D 1 , D 2 . To this end, each source can exploit Q non-overlapping frequency bands (the notation (q) will be used to refer to band q ∈ {1, . . . , Q}) which are assumed to be unitary. The signals transmitted by S 1 and S 2 in band (q), denoted by X (q) 1 and X (q) 2 , respectively, are assumed to be independent and subject to power constraints: ∀i ∈ {1, 2},
For i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by θ (q) i the fraction of power that is used by S i for transmitting in band (q) that is E|X
i P i . On each band (q), a relaying node R (q) is available. Each relaying node is assumed to operate in the full-duplex mode. The transmit power at each relay is also subject to a constraint
r . Note that the relay transmit power in band (q) is subject to an individual constraint, which implicitly means that the relays are not co-located (operating in the same frequency band) Otherwise, for a single relay operating in Q bands, the power constraint would be 
where
i ), i ∈ {1, 2, r}, represents the Gaussian complex noise on band (q) and, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, r}, h (q) ij is the channel gain between S i and D j in band (q), with the convention h rr = 0.
April 16, 2009 DRAFT As justified in Part I, we consider a realistic situation where only large scale propagation effects can be taken into account by the users to optimize their rates. Thus the channel gains are considered to be static.
Concerning channel state information (CSI), we will always assume coherent communications between each transmitter-receiver pair (S i , D i ) whereas, at the transmitters, the information assumptions will be contextdepending and deduced from the latter. At D 1 and D 2 , single-user decoding (SUD) will always be assumed.
It is a realistic assumption in a framework where devices operate in unlicensed bands in an a priori noncoordinated manner. At the relays R (q) , q ∈ {1, ..., Q}, the reception scheme implemented will depend on the protocol assumed. The expression of the signals X (q) r depend on the respective protocol and will therefore also be explicated in the corresponding sections. At last, we will use the same specific notations as in Part I: The capacity function for complex signals is denoted by C(x) log 2 (1 + x); for any real a ∈ [0, 1], the quantity a will stand for a = 1 − a; the notation −i will mean that −i = 1 if i = 2 and −i = 2 if i = 1.
III. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FOR THE ZDSAF PROTOCOL
In this section, we assume that the relay nodes implement the ZDSAF protocol, which has already been described in Part I. One of the nice features of the (analog) ZDSAF protocol is that relays are very easy to be deployed since they can be used without any change on the existing (non-cooperative) communication system.
The amplification factor/gain for the relay R (q) will be denoted by a (q) r . We have discussed the optimal choice of this parameter in Part I. In this part, we consider two choices for a (q) r : (A) the case where it is chosen to saturate the transmit power constraint at R (q) that is, a
(B) the case where it is a constant w.r.t. θ r . In this section, we prove the existence of an NE in the most general case, i.e, case (A). The reason for analyzing case (B) is at least twofold. First, in practice, it corresponds to the situation where the relay is an analog repeater, which is very easy to be implemented. The second motivation is technical. While the determination of the selfish PA policies for the different sources at the equilibrium is always possible numerically, case (B) allows one to analytically determine the number of Nash equilibria and corresponding policies. Before treating cases (A) and (B) in detail, we now describe the non-cooperative PA game with ZDSAF. Indeed, one of our goals is to know how each selfish transmitter is going to allocate its available power between the different bands, given the fact that the transmitters are able to observe each other and react accordingly. This situation of interaction can be modeled by a non-cooperative game where: (i) the players of the game are the two April 16, 2009 DRAFT information sources or transmitters; (ii) the strategy of transmitter i consists in choosing θ i = (θ
is its achievable transmission rate given by u
is the rate user i obtains by using band (q) when the ZDSAF protocol is used by the relay R (q) . The latter quantity has been shown to be (in Part I):
with ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, j = −i and ρ
2 ) and, in case (B), a
r . Without loss of generality and for sake of clarity we will assume in Sec. III that
= P r and we introduce the quantities ρ i = P i N . Additionally, we suppose that the game is played once (one-shot game), the users are rational (each selfish player does what is best for itself) and the game is with complete information that is, every player knows the triple
, where K = {1, 2} is used to refer to the set of players. From now on, we will call state of the network the vector of power fractions that the users allocate to the IRCs i.e., θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 ).
In distributed networks where users are selfish and free decision makers who interact with each other, a desirable feature for the network is the existence of an equilibrium or a stable operating state of the system. In this respect, the Nash equilibrium [7] corresponds to a state of the network from which the users do not have any incentive to deviate unilaterally, because otherwise they would lose in terms of utility; this translates mathematically by the following definition.
A. Case of full power regime
In this section, a
2 ) ∀q ∈ {1, ..., Q}. Under this assumption we can state the following existence theorem.
Theorem 3.2:
[Existence of an NE for ZDSAF when a
2 )] There exists at least one pure NE in the PA game G AF .
The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix A. Here, we will just give a few comments on it. It is based on Theorem 1 in [3] . The latter theorem states that in a game with a finite number of players, if for every player (i) the strategy set is convex and compact, 2) its utility is continuous in the vector of strategies and 3) concave in its own strategy, then the existence of at least one pure NE is guaranteed. In our setup it is easy to check that conditions 1) and 2) are met. Verifying condition 3) for the utility u i is however more involving. Indeed, it can be checked that the second-order derivative of R The proved theorem indicates, in particular, that whatever the values of the channel gains h ij , (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, r} 2 , there exists an equilibrium. As a consequence, if some relays are added in the network, the transmitters will adapt their PA policies accordingly and, whatever the locations of the relays, the selfish behavior of the transmitters will drive the network to an equilibrium. This is a nice property for the system under investigation. The question to know which equilibrium is also an interesting issue to be treated. We will treat it partially in this paper and leave it as an extension of this work. In the next sub-section we analyze a useful and simple case where the equilibria can be determined.
B. Case of fixed amplification gains
In this section, we assume Q = 2 and that each transmitter saturates its power constraint that is, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, θ
Thus, for the sake of clarity, we rename the power fractions in bands (1) and (2) as:
2 = θ 2 in the remaining of this section. More importantly, we suppose that ∀q ∈ {1, 2}, a
r ∈ [0,ã r (1, 1)], a fixed constant. This choice is interesting in terms of both, the simplicity of the relays (simple repeaters) and the information assumptions. It is true that choosing the amplification gain a r =ã (q) r (θ 1 , θ 2 ), as above, allows the relay nodes to exploit all their available powers. However, it also assumes the presence of a mechanism to estimate the power of the received signals at these relay nodes.
While this can be easy for a digital relay transceiver that knows the possible training sequences used by April 16, 2009 DRAFT the sources, it might be impossible if the relay is a simple analog power amplifier without automatic gain control. Furthermore, the case a
r has a very interesting convergence property which allows to relax some information assumptions at the transmitters. To understand this and determine the Nash equilibria, consider the best responses (BRs) of the different players. The BR of player i to player j is defined by
In general, it is a correspondence but in our case it is just a function. The equilibrium points precisely correspond to the intersection of the BRs of the two users. In this case, using the Lagrangian functions to impose the power constraint, it can be checked that:
is an affine function of θ j ; for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 1)}, c ii = 2|A
(1) If the channel gains are thought of as the realizations of continuous random variables, it is easy to prove that the probability of observing the necessary conditions on the channel gains for having two NEs or an infinite number of NEs is zero. Said otherwise, if one puts the relays in arbitrary places, there will be, with probability one, either one or three NE, depending on the channel gains. When the channel gains are such that the NE is unique, the unique NE can be shown to be:
When there are three NE, it is a priori impossible to predict the NE that will be effectively observed in the one-shot game. In fact, in practice, in a context of cognitive transmitters, it is possible to predict the equilibrium of the network. In practice, a multi-band IRC with cognitive transmitters will work as follows.
First, there is no reason why the sources should start transmitting at the same time. Thus, one transmitter, say i, will be alone and using a certain PA policy. The transmitter coming after, namely S −i , will sense
April 16, 2009 DRAFT its environment and play its BR to what it observes. As a consequence, user i will move to a new policy, maximizing its BR to what transmitter −i has played. User i will then re-adapt its policy and so on. The key question is: does this procedure converge? This is where the nice property of the BRs come into play.
It can be checked that this procedure will converge to one of the three NE predicted by the one-shot game.
The observed NE can be predicted by knowing the initial network state that is, the PA policy played by the first player starting to transmit; this will be illustrated in Sec. VII. In fact, even though the BRs are just piecewise affine and not affine (as in a Cournot duopoly [8] ), the game has the same convergence property as a Cournot duopoly. To implement such an iterative procedure (called the Cournot tâtonnement process in [9] ), it can be checked that the transmitters need to know less network parameters than in the original game where the amplification factor saturates the constraint. In fact, the needed parameters can be acquired by realistic sensing techniques or feedback mechanisms based on standard estimation procedures, which is particularly easy in fast fading environment since the path loss can be considered to be constant during a period of time long enough to store a large number of channel realizations.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FOR THE DF PROTOCOL
In this section, the relays are assumed to be able to reliably decode the messages sent by the two information sources. In Gaussian relay channels, the DF protocol can perform better than the AF and EF protocols in terms of transmission rate; this typically occurs when the relay is close to the source relatively to the destination [10] . The principle of the DF protocol is reviewed in Part I. Here we will just mention that, in the Gaussian relay channel, the source superposes two codewords corresponding to two messages i.e., a coarse message reliably decodable by the destination alone and a fine message that the destination reliably decodes with the help of the relay node. This explains the following structure for the signals transmitted by S 1 and S 2 in the type of networks we consider in this paper:
r,i where the signals X i,0 precisely corresponds to the coarse message while the second one corresponds to the fine message. Indeed, at the relay R (q) , the transmitted signal writes as:
r,2 . We see that the problem of resources allocation is more complex than in the case of AF. There are actually three power allocation problems instead of one: (1) like AF, each information source needs to allocate its power between the Q different bands; (2) in each band, each source needs to tune its cooperation degree τ and ν (q) translate these three PA problems respectively:
r ). In this paper, the authors restrict their attention to two special cases of PA games and let the general case where the strategy of a user is (θ i , τ i ) = (θ
) as an interesting and significant extension of this paper. First, we consider the PA game (1) by supposing the cooperation degrees and PA policies at the relays to be fixed (Sec. IV-A). Second, we analyze the PA game (2) where only the cooperation degrees can be tuned, the other parameters being assumed to be fixed (Sec. IV-B). The first game allows one to be coherent with the PA game with AF while the second game allows one to study the game introduced in Part I. In both sub-sections we assume that each relay implements SUD. This choice is fair for the transmitters, does not involve any additional signalling and allows us to cope with the constraint on the sum-rate on each multiple
, which would make the game more complex to be played and is therefore left as an extension of this paper. Also, in both sub-sections the utility of a transmitter will have the same expression that is, ∀i ∈ {1, 2}, u
and (ν (q) , τ
1 , τ
2 ) ∈ [0, 1] 3 , and ν (q) = 1 − ν (q) . Note that we have not indicated the arguments of u DF i
i.e., the strategies of the users, since these are context-dependent. In Sec. IV-A, the strategy of user i is
).
A. Allocating the power between the bands
Here we assume that the cooperation degrees (τ 1 , τ 2 ) are fixed and the strategy for user i consists in choosing θ i . The PA game is similar to that encoutered with the AF protocol. Therefore, here again, the w.r.t. θ i . In contrast with AF, this task can be checked to be very easy for the rates achieved by using DF. Having a concave game in the sense of Rosen [3] , the following existence theorem follows.
Theorem 4.1: [Existence of an NE for the DF protocol]
The game defined by
has always at least one pure NE.
While the existence is easy to prove, the uniqueness remains a though problem. For example, the diagonally strict concavity condition of [3] , which is a sufficient condition for uniqueness for concave games, is not trivial to be checked.
B. Allocating the power between the coarse and fine signals
We now suppose that the power fractions θ 1 and θ 2 allocated to the Q bands are fixed (for example
, which corresponds to a uniform PA). We therefore obtain exactly the game we have we see that the DF protocol is the only protocol that introduces a game in a natural manner that is, even if there is no multiple antenna transmitters, multi-carrier systems, multi-slot transmissions, etc. Fortunately, the game where each transmitter tunes their cooperation degree with the relays R (q) has at least one equilibrium, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2: [Existence of an NE for the DF protocol]
at least one pure NE.
The proof also follows from [3] .
V. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS FOR THE EF PROTOCOL
In this section, we make the same assumptions as in Sec. IV concerning the reception schemes and PA policies at the relays: we assume that each relay R (q) , D 1 and D 2 implement single-user decoding and the PA policy at each relay i.e., ν (q) is fixed. Each relay now implements the EF protocol. The principle of the EF protocol in the relay channel is to send an approximated version of the relay's observation signal to the receiver. In Part I, we have seen that, in IRCs, the EF protocol can have at least two natural variants depending on whether the relay constructs a unique estimate of the signal it receives that is decodable by April 16, 2009 DRAFT both receivers or two estimates, each of them being decodable by one or two receivers. We have called the two corresponding schemes the single-level compression scheme and bi-level compression scheme. Both because of the lack of space and for simplicity reasons, we treat here the case of EF with two compression levels. The single-level compression scheme implies a more complicated expression of the compression noise level that makes the concavity issue strenuous to deal with. Under this assumption, the utility for user i ∈ {1, 2} can be expressed as follows:
" "˛h
What is interesting with EF is that, here again, one can prove that the utility is concave for every user. This is the purpose of the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1: [Existence of an NE for the bi-level compression EF protocol] The game defined by
, has always at least one pure NE.
To be able to apply Theorem of Rosen [3] , we have to prove that the utility u wz,i , which appears in the denominator of the capacity function in Eq. (9), also depends on the strategy θ i of transmitter i. It turns out that it is still possible to prove the desired result as shown in Appendix C.
VI. STACKELBERG FORMULATION
We have mentioned that a strong motivation for studying IRCs is to be able to introduce relays in a network with non-coordinated and interfering pairs of terminals. For example, relays could be introduced by an operator aiming at improving the performance of the communications of his subscribers. In such a April 16, 2009 DRAFT scenario, the operator acts as a player and more precisely as a game leader in the sense of [11] . In [11] 2) in the case of AF, the amplification gain of each relay;
3) in the case of DF and EF, the power allocation policy between the two cooperative signals at each relay i.e., the parameter ν (q) .
Therefore, the group of relays can be thought of as a player who maximizes its own utility. This utility can be the individual utility of a given transmitter (picture one WiFi subscriber who wants to increase his downlink throughput by locating his cellular phone somewhere in his apartment while his neighbor can also exploit the same spectral resources) or the network sum-rate (in the case of an operator). In the latter case, the operator possesses some degrees of freedom to make the Nash equilibrium more efficient. In the next section, we will use implicitly the Stackelberg formulation to determine the best location for a relay in a given scenario.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
First, we show that in the PA game with ZDSAF, one can have three possible Nash equilibria. For a given typical scenario, which does not need to be given here but can be found in [2] , Fig. 1 represents the BRs of the two transmitters. We see that there are three intersection points and therefore three Nash equilibria.
As explained in Sec. III, the effectively observed NE in a one-shot game is not predictable without any additional assumptions but the Cournot tatônnement procedure converges towards a given NE which can be predicted from the sole knowledge of the starting point of the game, namely θ The system considered is composed of an IRC in parallel with an interference channel (IC) [12] , thus Q = 2. and
for (i, j) ∈ {1, 2, r} 2 where d 0 = 1 m is a reference distance. As in Part I, to avoid any divergence for the path loss in d ij = 0 we assume that the relay is not in the plane but at ǫ = 0.5 m from it i.e., the relay location is given by the (x R , y R , z R ) where z R is fixed and equals 0.5 m. We will also assume that N
r will be denoted by N r and also P
(1) r = P r , A
Optimal relay amplification gain for ZDSAF. First we consider the ZDSAF relaying scheme assuming a fixed amplification gain a r = A r (Sec. III-B). We want to analyze the influence of the value of the amplification factor, A r ∈ [0,ã r (1, 1)], on the achievable network sum-rate at the NE. This is what Fig. 2 shows for the following scenario: ǫ = 0.5 m, P 1 = 20 dBm, P 2 = 23 dBm, P r = 22 dBm, N 1 = 10 dBm,
We observe that the optimal value is A * r = 0.05 and is not equal to the one saturating the relay power constraintã r (1, 1) = 0.17. This result illustrates for the sum-rate what we have proved analytically in Part I for the individual rate of a given user.
Optimal relay location for ZDSAF. Now, we consider the ZDSAF when the relay full power regime is assumed, a r =ã r (θ 1 , θ 2 ) (Sec. III-A) and study the relay location problem. Fig. 3(a) represents the achievable network sum-rate as a function of the relay position (
2 for the scenario: P 1 = 20 dBm, P 2 = 17 dBm, P r = 22 dBm, N 1 = 10 dBm, N 2 = 9 dBm, N r = 7 dBm, γ (1) = 2.5 and γ is the region around S 1 (resp. S 2 ). We see that the intersection between these regions corresponds to small area. This quite general observation shows that the selfish behavior of the users leads to self-regulating the interference in the network. Said otherwise the selfish behavior of each transmitter leads it to leave the relay to the other transmitter when it is too far from it. Thus, when one transmitter uses the relay, it is often alone and sees no interference. In these conditions, by considering the path loss effects it can be proved that the optimal relay position is on the segment between the considered source and destination nodes. This also explains why the position that maximizes the network sum-rate is also on one of the segments from S i to
Optimal relay power allocation at the relay for DF and EF. For the DF protocol we fix the cooperation degrees τ 1 = 0 and τ 2 = 0. In Fig. 4 , we plot the achievable sum-rate at the equilibrium as a function of the relay power allocation policy is ν ∈ [0, 1] (with the convention ν = ν (1) ) for the scenario: x R = 0 m, y R = 0 m, P 1 = 22 dBm, P 2 = 17 dBm, P r = 23 dBm, N 1 = 7 dBm, N 2 = 9 dBm, N r = 0 dBm, γ (1) = 2.5 and γ (2) = 2. We observe that, for both protocols, the optimal power allocation ν * = 1, meaning that the relay allocates all its available power to the better receiver, D 1 . In this case the relay is in very good conditions and can therefore reliably decode the source messages. This explains why DF outperforms EF which is in agreement with the observations we have made in Part I. We have observed that, in general, the network sum-rate is not concave w.r.t. ν ∈ [0, 1] and that the optimal power allocation lies on the borders ν * ∈ {0, 1} for both relaying protocols. From Fig. 4 we also see that the fair PA policy that is, ν = 1 2 can lead to a relatively significant performance loss.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced and studied a channel model which is very useful to analyze scenarios where each wireless device operating in unlicensed bands is offered the opportunity to exploit additional resources to increase its own transmission rate. Here the additional resources consist of spectrum plus cooperation power. We have analyzed in detail the problem of decentralized PA for the three dominant classes of relaying protocols (AF, DF, EF) and shown the existence of an equilibrium for the network for all these protocols. There can be multiple equilibria as proved for the game with AF. Fortunately, we have proved that in the case of AF with fixed amplification gain, the Cournot tâtonnement converges to an NE that be predicted from the sole knowledge of the starting point of the game. This useful analysis needs to be extended to the case of the DF and EF protocols. We have seen that our problem can also be formulated as a Stackelberg game where the relay is the game leader and optimizes its amplification gain when AF is used, its location, and its power allocation between the two cooperative signals when DF or EF is implemented.
This analysis is useful when adding some relaying nodes in a pre-existing network in order to improve its performance. In particular it has shown how to optimally locate the relay in a simple scenario and how the selfish behavior of the users leads to self-regulating the interference in the network. Important issues like i . We will further consider only user 1 and prove the concavity of R can be written as
. In what follows we will
For sake of clarity we denote by λ = ρ 1 |h
, β = |h
, ε 2 =˛˛˛h
, and we define the function
The first derivative of Φ 1 is given by Φ ′ (θ
x ′′ , where x ′ and x ′′ are the first and second order derivatives of x(θ (q) 1 ). Let us define the functions N (·) and M(·) that give the numerator and the denominator of a fraction, respectively. One can show that:
and that
We obtain that
April 16, 2009 DRAFT and
Considering all these definitions we further obtain
and also that:
, one can easily verify that:
Furthermore, observing that
1 is a concave function of θ .
• If
, then the NE is characterized by θ , then there are three different NE:
, 0)}.
, then there are only two different NE: (θ
, then there are two NE: (θ i . Consider w.l.o.g. the case of user 1. We follow a similar approach to the AF case, based on the second derivative of R (q) 1 given in Eq. (9) . After some manipulations we obtain the following relation:
where (for sake of clarity we have denoted h (q) ij by h ij ):
1 ,
First note that
2 P 2 ≥ 0 and thus we have that all the terms Λ k ≥ 0, k ∈ {1, . . . , 8}. Also we can easily see from Eq. Therefore we obtain the desired result NM 1 ≤ 0 and thus M 1 ≥ 0, which implies that Achievable sum−rate L=10m, ε=0.5 m, P 1 =20dBm, P 2 =23dBm, P r =22 dBm, N 1 =10dBm, N 2 =9dBm, N r =7dBm, γ Fig. 4 . EF vs. DF relaying protocol. Achievable network sum-rate at the NE as a function of ν ∈ [0, 1] for L = 10m, ǫ = 1m, P1 = 22dBm, P2 = 17dBm, Pr = 23dBm, N1 = 7dBm, N2 = 9dBm, Nr = 0dBm, γ (1) = 2.5 and γ (2) = 2. The optimal relay PA ν * = 1 is in favor of the better user and outperforms the uniform relay PA ν = 0.5 for both EF and DF.
